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VICTIM OR THE CRIME?': THE GOVERNMENT'S
BURDEN IN PROVING PREDISPOSITION IN
FEDERAL ENTRAPMENT CASES
INTRODUCTION
There is no real question as to the necessity of undercover opera-
tions in combating crime, and government officials may furnish "op-
portunities or facilities for the commission of the offense."'2 Courts
have long recognized that "[a]rtifice and stratagem may be employed
to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises."' 3 It is, however, prob-
lematic "when the criminal design originates with the officials of the
Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the
disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in
order that they may prosecute." 4 It is in these instances when the de-
fense of entrapment ought to succeed.
The entrapment defense should protect an otherwise law-abiding
citizen from government officials that attempt to prey upon his needs
and weaknesses in order to persuade him to commit a crime.5 The
courts make the defense available because without such a defense, the
government would not be restricted from creating crime and cor-
rupting the otherwise innocent.6 Essentially, the defense preserves
the integrity of the judiciary by refusing to "permit [its] process to be
used in aid of a scheme for the actual creation of a crime by those
whose duty is to deter its commission. ' 7
1. GRATEFUL DEAD, Victim or the Crime, on IN THE DARK (Arista Records 1987).
2. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932).
3. Id. (citing Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311, 315 (1897); Andrews v. United States, 162
U.S. 420, 423 (1896); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 42 (1896); Goode v. United States, 159
U.S. 663, 669 (1895); Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 610 (1895); United States v.
Reisenweber, 288 F. 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1923); Bates v. United States, 10 F. 92, 94 (N.D. Ill. 1881)).
4. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442.
5. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992) ("When the Government's quest
for convictions leads to the apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his
own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law, the courts should intervene."); Harri-
son v. State, 442 A.2d 1377, 1387 (Del. 1982) (stating that the entrapment defense protects
against "tricky policemen trying to prey upon the needs and weaknesses of people and to per-
suade innocent citizens to commit crimes").
6. Stephen A. Miller, Comment, The Case for Preserving the Outrageous Government Con-
duct Defense, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 305, 308-09 (1996).
7. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 454.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Almost every American jurisdiction recognizes some variation of
the entrapment defense. 8 At the federal level, it remains a common
law defense; federal statutes make no mention of it.9 The Supreme
Court has stated that the concept of entrapment is rooted in congres-
sional intent. It is not a judiciary "veto over law enforcement prac-
tices," as it stems from the concept that "Congress could not have
intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has committed all
the elements of a proscribed offense, but was induced to commit them
by the Government." 10
Entrapment is typically defined as "[t]he act of officers or agents of
the government in inducing a person to commit a crime not contem-
plated by him, for the purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution
against him."'" It is only available as a defense when a government
agent in some way induces the defendant to commit a crime. 12 Even if
governmental inducement is present, however, the entrapment de-
fense will not succeed if the defendant was predisposed to engage in
the criminal activity. 13 A defendant always has the burden of produc-
tion for the defense of entrapment, meaning that he must show that a
government agent induced or encouraged the criminal conduct. 14 If a
defendant also proffers evidence that he was not predisposed to com-
mit the crime, "the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act
prior to first being approached by Government agents. 1 5 Thus, the
likelihood of successfully asserting the entrapment defense rested
upon whether the individual defendant was predisposed to commit the
crime. Simply stated, if the defendant was predisposed, then the gov-
ernment's inducement was not the reason for the defendant's criminal
activity; therefore, he should be held accountable for his criminal
activity.
Federal courts have been unable to agree on the critical element of
the defense: How should predisposition be determined?' 6 This Com-
8. 2 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 209, at 509 (1984).
9. The states have been free to form their own notions of the entrapment defense as they have
established their own parameters and application of the defense in state statutes. Id. § 1.12, at
38.
10. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973).
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 532 (6th ed. 1990).
12. 2 ROBINSON, supra note 8, § 209(a), at 510.
13. Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1988).
14. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT", JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2, at 610
(2d ed. 1986).
15. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992).
16. See, e.g., A National Survey of Current Law-Summary and Analysis, 65 U.S.L.W. 1173
(1997); Martha Middleton, 7th Circuit Departs on Entrapment, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 15, 1993, at 9;
950 [Vol. 48:949
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ment will focus on the varying approaches the federal courts have
taken to determine predisposition and whether they succeed in pro-
tecting the otherwise innocent person from those government officials
that will prey upon his needs and weaknesses in order to persuade him
to commit a crime. Part I begins by examining the evolution and his-
tory of the entrapment defense from its origin in federal case law. 17
The Supreme Court's most recent decision on the matter in Jacobson
v. United States18 is reviewed in detail. This provides a proper frame-
work for identifying and analyzing the recent split between the federal
circuit courts with respect to the predisposition requirement. This
Comment then examines the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Thickstun' 9 to determine whether it erred
in holding that a determination of predisposition does not require a
defendant to be in a position to commit the crime without government
assistance. 20 Part II of this Comment urges the Supreme Court to
adopt a two-tier test for evaluating a defendant's predisposition to
commit a crime when a defendant asserts the entrapment defense.2'
The complexity and subtle nuances in the entrapment doctrine raise
many interesting questions that are beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. First, the various state applications of the defense will not be
explored herein, as this Comment will focus only on the Supreme
Court and the federal courts' treatment of entrapment. 22 Further-
more, this Comment will not address the element of government in-
ducement and potential due process violations. 23 Such subject matter
is not germane to a discussion of the predisposition requirement. Fi-
nally, this Comment will not provide a detailed discussion about the
long-standing debate24 over the objective 25 or subjective26 analysis of
Shannon P. Duffy, Entrapment Defense is Redefined: Federal Judge Uses Definition of 1st Circuit,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 19, 1996, at A.
17. See infra Part I.
18. 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
19. 110 F.3d 1394 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 917 (1997).
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. For such a discussion, see Erich Weyand, Comment, Entrapment: From Sorrells to Jacob-
son-The Development Continues, 20 OHio N.U. L. REV. 293 (1993).
23. For a thorough analysis of the due process claim in entrapment cases, see Paul Marcus,
The Due Process Defense in Entrapment Cases: The Journey Back, 27 AM. CgRiM. L. REV. 457
(1990).
24. Paul Marcus, Presenting, Back from the [Almost] Dead, The Entrapment Defense, 47 FLA.
L. REV. 205 (1995).
The debate was furious over an extended period of time. See, for instance, the ex-
changes between Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435 (1932); Chief Justice Warren and Justice Frankfurter in Sherman, 356 at
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entrapment. 27 Although a debate over these two tests has provided
discussion for many years, the majority of the United States Supreme
Court has always held that the predisposition of the defendant is rele-
vant when he raises the entrapment defense.28 While an awareness of
this debate may be important, recent case law illustrates that there is
an increasing need to resolve how the courts ought to determine
whether a defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Development of the Entrapment Defense and the
Concept of Predisposition Prior to Jacobson v. United
States
The idea of entrapment has existed at least as long as the tale of
Adam and Eve. 29 American courts, however, were slow to recognize
entrapment as a valid defense.30 While a few early federal cases con-
sidered the defense of entrapment, 31 it was not until 1915 that a fed-
eral circuit court recognized entrapment as a defense to a crime. 32 In
Woo Wai v. United States,33 the defendants were charged with conspir-
369; Justices Rehnquist and Stewart in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973);
and Justices Rehnquist and Brennan in Hampton, 425 U.S. at 484.
Id. at 214 n.83.
25. The objective test, which focuses exclusively on the conduct of the government and its
agents, Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 450-51, has never been adopted by the Court. Id.
26. The subjective test, which focuses on the intent or predisposition of the defendant, has
always been employed by the Court. Id.
27. For a discussion of these alternative approaches, see W.H. Johnson III, Proving A Crimi-
nal Predisposition: Separating The Unwary Innocent From The Unwary Criminal, 43 DUKE L.J.
384 (1993); Weyand, supra note 22, at 293.
28. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
[T]he defense of entrapment is not simply that the particular act was committed at the
instance of government officials. That is often the case where the proper action of
these officials leads to the revelation of criminal enterprises. The predisposition and
criminal design of the defendant are relevant .... [I]f the defendant seeks acquittal by
reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into
his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue.
Id. (citation omitted).
29. Genesis 3:13. The book of Genesis tells how God commanded Adam and Even not to eat
fruit from a tree in the Garden of Eden. Id. When Eve was confronted by God after disobeying
him, she offered her very own version of the entrapment defense: "The serpent beguiled me, and
I did eat." Id.; see Scott C. Paton, Note, "The Government Made Me Do It": A Proposed Ap-
proach to Entrapment Under Jacobson v. United States, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 995, 996 (1994)
(citing Board of Comm'rs v. Backus, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 33, 42 (1864)).
30. PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE § 1.03, at 7 (1989).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Whittier, 28 F. Cas. 591 (E.D. Mo. 1878) (No. 16,688); United
States v. Adams, 59 F. 674 (D. Or. 1894).
32. Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
33. Id.
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ing to bring illegal Chinese immigrants into the United States from
Mexico. 34 An agent suspected that Woo Wai possessed information
regarding other unlawful importations. 35 He devised a plan to make
Woo Wai talk by inducing him to commit the crime of bringing other
Chinese immigrants into the United States.36 Agents soon began urg-
ing Woo Wai to participate in a scheme to bring Chinese immigrants
across the border.37 After the scheme was "assiduously and persist-
ently urged upon him," he agreed to enter into the scheme and was
later charged and convicted for this crime.38 Woo Wai argued that he
had been "lured by government officers" into committing the crime,
and therefore, he had committed no offense. 39 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed Woo Wai's conviction, stating that it was
"against public policy to sustain a conviction obtained" in this man-
ner.40 Since Woo Wai, the entrapment defense has often been raised
in the lower federal courts.41
The United States Supreme Court first dealt with the issue of en-
trapment in 1928 in Casey v. United States.42 In Casey, the defendant
was charged with supplying morphine to prison inmates.43 The de-
fendant was a lawyer who frequently visited inmates in order to pro-
vide legal consultation.44 The jailer observed that those with whom
Casey had visited were often under the influence of narcotics.45 The
34. Id. at 413.
35. Id.
36. Id. "'He wanted to get this man, as it were, in the door, so that the man would have to
give him the information."' Id.
37. Id. The agent actually hired a private detective, who approached Woo Wai and told him
that he knew a way to make money. Id. He did not disclose any other information, but he
convinced Woo Wai to go with him to San Diego, where he introduced him to local inspectors of
immigration. Id. At this time, the detective informed Woo Wai of the plan to bring other illegal
Chinese immigrants across the Mexican border. Id.
38. Woo Wai, 22 F. at 414. When the scheme was first presented to Woo Wai, he stated, "'This
is in violation of the law. It could not be done."' Id. at 413. The immigration inspectors re-
sponded, "'Oh, well, if we make no arrest, who can make arrest? And then we don't want to go
to jail. You don't want to go to jail, and if you go to jail, we will go to jail."' Id.
39. Id. at 412-13.
40. Id. at 415.
Id. The court stated that the general rule with regard to entrapment is "'[t]he fact that a
detective or other person suspected that the defendant was about to commit a crime, and pre-
pared for his detection, as a result of which he was entrapped in its commission, is no excuse, if
the defendant alone conceived the original criminal design."' Id. at 414. The court expressed
concern that in this case, "the criminal act came from the officers of the government. The whole
scheme originated with them." Id. at 415.
41. MARCUS, supra note 30, § 1.03, at 13.
42. 276 U.S. 413 (1928).
43. Id. at 416-17.
44. Id. at 416.
45. Id. at 419.
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jailer instigated a plot to trap the defendant in the act of providing
narcotics.46 The plot involved surreptitiously recording conversations
in which inmates requested that he supply them with narcotics.4 7 The
majority dismissed the entrapment defense,48 but Justice Brandeis
paved the way for the acceptance of the entrapment defense with his
strong dissent.49 Brandeis stated:
The obstacle to the prosecution lies in the fact that the alleged crime
was instigated by officers of the Government; that the act for which
the Government seeks to punish the defendant is the fruit of their
criminal conspiracy to induce its commission. The Government
may set decoys to entrap criminals. But it may not provoke or cre-
ate a crime and then punish the criminal, its creature .... 50
Four years later, the Supreme Court recognized the defense of en-
trapment in the federal system in Sorrells v. United States.51 In Sor-
rells, the defendant was indicted for selling and possessing whiskey in
violation of the National Prohibition Act after being a target of law
officials' attempts to discover individuals illegally selling alcohol.5 2 In
that case, the government agents discovered that the defendant was a
veteran of World War I and utilized this fact to establish a rapport
with him.5 3 An agent twice asked the defendant to get him some li-
quor, and on each occasion the defendant said that he did not have
any.54 Then, after conversations about war experiences with another
agent from the same division in the service, the defendant agreed to
provide liquor to the agent.55 The defendant asserted the entrapment
defense, but both the trial and appellate court refused to sustain the
defense.56
46. Id. at 422-23.
47. Id. The scheme was devised by two federal narcotics officers and carried out with the help
of two of the inmates who were known as drug addicts. Id. at 422. The narcotics officers in-
stalled a dictaphone in the room where Casey was to meet with these inmates, so they could
listen to the conversations. Id. The inmates requested that Casey get them some morphine; he
agreed to do so. Id. It was then arranged that the morphine was to be "smuggled into the jail in
laundry." Id. After Casey gave the package to one of the inmate's relatives, it was brought to
the federal narcotics agents who tested it and found it to be morphine. Id. at 423.
48. Casey, 276 U.S. at 418-19. "We are not persuaded that the conduct of the officials was
different from or worse than ordering a drink of a suspected bootlegger." Id. at 419.
49. Id. at 421-25.
50. Id. at 423.
51. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
52. Id. at 438-41.
53. Id. at 439.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 438-39. The Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that "the defense of entrapment
can be maintained only where, as a result of inducement, the accused is placed in the attitude of
[Vol. 48:949
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defense of entrap-
ment was available and that the lower courts had erred in holding that
as a matter of law there was no entrapment.5 7 The Court looked to
the lower federal courts' application of the entrapment defense58 in
reaching its conclusion that the entrapment defense arises from the
interpretation of the statute that the defendant allegedly violated.59
In this instance, the Court concluded that when Congress enacted the
Prohibition Act it did not intend that "its processes of detection and
enforcement should be abused by the instigation by government offi-
cials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to
lure them to its commission and to punish them. ' 60 The Court opined
that in such instances, the defense of entrapment ought to be
available. 61
The Court further defined the defense by stating that it "is not sim-
ply that the particular act was committed at the instance of govern-
ment officials. . . .The predisposition and criminal design of the
defendant are relevant. '62 The Court concluded that the entrapment
defense proceeds on the theory that the defendant is not guilty when
government officials instigate the crime. The entrapment defense,
therefore, should not be viewed as analogous to a pardon in which the
guilty simply goes free. 63 The Court did not prohibit government un-
dercover operations in any way but held that the objective of under-
cover operations should be to reveal an established criminal design
and to expose the criminal's illegal activity.64 The Court concluded
that "[a] different question is presented when the criminal design
originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in
the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged
offense and induce its commission in order that they may
prosecute." 65
The decision that the Court reached in Sorrells relied, for the most
part, on the state of mind of the accused rather than on whether or not
having committed a crime which he did not intend to commit, or where, by reason of the consent
implied in the inducement, no crime has in fact been committed." Id. at 442.
57. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452.
58. Id. at 443.
59. Id. at 446.
60. Id. at 448-50.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 451.
63. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452.
64. Id. at 441-42.
65. Id. at 442.
1999]
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the government's conduct was reasonable.66 This established that the
only way the prosecution can defeat the entrapment defense is by suc-
cessfully proving that the defendant "was independently predisposed"
to commit the crime.67 In determining whether Sorrells was, in fact,
predisposed to commit the crime, the Court looked at whether "the
act for which defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibi-
tion agent," whether there was any evidence that Sorrells had sold
liquor prior to this act, and whether he has a reputation as a law-
abiding citizen.68 The Court justified such an inquiry, stating that "if
the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot com-
plain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct
and predisposition as bearing upon that issue. '69 After making this
inquiry, the Court concluded that Sorrells lacked an independent pre-
disposition; therefore, the entrapment defense was properly allowed. 70
The Court ordered that the "judgment should be reversed and the
cause remanded ... with instructions to quash the indictment and dis-
charge the defendant."'71
The Supreme Court did not revisit the entrapment issue until
twenty-six years later in Sherman v. United States.72 In Sherman, the
defendant met a government informer while he was being treated by a
doctor for a narcotics addiction.73 After meeting on several occasions,
their conversations progressed to a discussion about the difficulties in
their attempts to overcome their addictions. 74 The informer then
66. Id. at 458-59. Justice Roberts, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with the majority's rea-
soning. Id. Instead, he suggested that the entrapment defense should focus only on the govern-
ment's conduct and not on the defendant's character. Id. at 459. Roberts stated that:
To say that [the instigation and inducement of a crime by an official of government] is
condoned and rendered innocuous by the fact that the defendant had a bad reputation
or had previously transgressed is wholly to disregard the reason for refusing the
processes of the court to consummate an abhorrent transaction.
Id.
67. Stephen Garbaum, Note, "The Government Made Me Do It": A Proposed Approach to
Entrapment Under Jacobson v. United States, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 995, 999 (1994).
68. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441.
69. Id. at 451.
70. Id. at 441.
It is clear that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the act for which
defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibition agent,... that defendant
had no previous disposition to commit it but was an industrious, law-abiding citizen,
and that the agent lured defendant, otherwise innocent, to its commission by repeated
and persistent solicitation in which he succeeded by taking advantage of the sentiment
aroused by reminiscences of their experiences as companions in arms in the World War.
Id.
71. Id. at 459.
72. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
73. Id. at 371.
74. Id.
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asked Sherman if he knew of any good sources for narcotics and if he
could supply him with a source because he was not responding to
treatment for his addiction.75 The informer had to ask the defendant
a number of times before the defendant actually agreed to get the
narcotics for him.76
In concluding that the defendant was entrapped as a matter of law,
the Supreme Court relied heavily on its analysis in Sorrells.77 The
Court indicated that the case illustrated "an evil which the defense of
entrapment is designed to overcome. s78 The record supported the
fact that the defendant was trying to overcome his narcotics habit at
the time he was approached.79 The Court stated that effective law
enforcement does not require the Government to play on the weak-
nesses of an otherwise innocent defendant and deceive him into com-
mitting a crime that he would otherwise not have attempted.80 The
Court said, in what has become a famous quote, that "[t]o determine
whether entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn be-
tween the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary
criminal." 8
The majority concentrated upon whether the defendant was predis-
posed to commit the crime in order to determine whether he was in-
deed "innocent" or "criminal. '8 2 In reaching its conclusion that
Sherman lacked predisposition, the majority relied on the fact that
Sherman was susceptible to the government solicitation because he
was a former addict.8 3 The Court also noted that there was no evi-
dence that he was currently in the narcotics trade and that no narcot-
ics were found in a search of Sherman's apartment after he was
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 372-73. The Court rejected the analysis set forth in the concurring opinion which
argued that the majority should reconsider the reasoning in Sorrells because "[in a matter of this
kind the Court should not . . . forego re-examination to achieve clarity of thought, because
confused and inadequate analysis is too apt gradually to lead to a course of decisions that di-
verges from the true ends to be pursued." Id. at 379.
78. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376.
79. Id. at 375-76.
80. Id. at 376.
81. Id. at 372.
82. Id. at 375-76.
In 1942 petitioner was convicted of illegally selling narcotics; in 1946 he was convicted
of illegally possessing them. However, a nine-year-old sales conviction and a five-year-
old possession conviction are insufficient to prove petitioner had a readiness to sell
narcotics at the time [the informer] approached him, particularly when we must assume
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arrested.84 The evidence revealed that the defendant was more prop-
erly characterized as "innocent" rather than "criminal"; therefore, he
had a valid entrapment claim.85
In United States v. Russell,86 the Supreme Court further solidified
the view that the key inquiry in entrapment claims focuses on the de-
fendant's state of mind, not on the government's involvement. In
Russell, an undercover agent was assigned to infiltrate what the gov-
ernment believed to be an ongoing operation suspected of producing
methamphetamine. 87 The agent offered to supply Russell with a
scarce but lawful ingredient essential to the production of
methamphetamine in return for one-half of the drugs produced.88
One of the co-defendants indicated that he had been producing the
drug for over six months and gave the agent a sample from the last
batch that he had made.89 Russell later accepted the offer, and the
agent provided the ingredient. 90 Russell was eventually indicted for
having unlawfully manufactured and processed methamphetamine
and for having unlawfully sold and delivered the drug.91 The jury
found him guilty, but the court of appeals reversed, stating that there
had been "an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the
criminal enterprise" because of the agent's conduct in supplying the
scarce ingredient essential for manufacturing the substance. 92
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals had "in effect
expanded the traditional notion of entrapment, which focuses on the
predisposition of the defendant, to mandate dismissal of a criminal
prosecution whenever the court determines that there has been 'an
intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal enter-
prise."' 93 The Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier holdings in Sor-
rells and Sherman by stating that "[i]t is only when the Government's
84. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375-76.
85. Id.
86. MARCUS, supra note 30, § 1.08, at 28 (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435
(1973)).
[E]ntrapment is a relatively limited defense. It is rooted, not in any authority of the
Judicial Branch to dismiss prosecutions for what it feels to have been "overzealous law
enforcement," but instead in the notion that Congress could not have intended criminal
punishment for a defendant who has committed all the elements of a proscribed offense
but was induced to commit them by the Government.
Id.
87. Russell, 411 U.S. at 425.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 426.
91. Id. at 424.
92. Id. at 423.
93. Russell, 411 U.S. at 427.
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deception actually implants the criminal design in the mind of the de-
fendant that the defense of entrapment comes into play."' 94 The Court
concluded that the evidence showed that Russell was an active partici-
pant in illegal drug manufacturing both before and after the govern-
ment appeared on the scene.95 Because the evidence supported the
finding that Russell was predisposed to commit the criminal acts, the
Court held that his claim of entrapment must fail.96
In Hampton v. United States,97 the Supreme Court refused to stray
from its holding that the entrapment defense is unavailable to a de-
fendant who, regardless of the government's conduct, is predisposed
to commit the crime in question. In Hampton, the defendant was con-
victed of distributing heroin after selling it to government agents.98
Hampton conceded that he was predisposed but argued that he should
have been acquitted under the defense of entrapment because the
drug was supplied to him by a government informant.99 The Court
again held that the defendant's concession of predisposition rendered
the entrapment defense unavailable to him.100 The Court reiterated
that a defendant is protected by the entrapment defense if it is the
government activity that implants the disposition to commit the of-
fense into the mind of an innocent person, thereby inducing commis-
sion of the crime. 1 1 The Court stated that "[i]f the police engage in
illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the scope of their
duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally culpable defendant,
but in prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions of state
or federal law."' 01 2 In essence, the Court expanded the importance of
the state of mind inquiry by condemning the accused no matter what
government misconduct occurred.
-Since Sorrells, the Court has consistently agreed that a valid entrap-
ment defense has two related elements: (1) government inducement
of the crime; and (2) a lack of predisposition on the part of the de-
fendant to engage in criminal activity. 0 3 The element of predisposi-
tion, which is the principal element in the defense of entrapment,
focuses on whether a defendant was an "unwary innocent" or an "un-
94. Id. at 436.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
98. Id. at 485.
99. Id. at 487 n.3.
100. Id. at 490.
101. Id. (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932)).
102. Id. (finding that the police had acted in concert with the defendant).
103. Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1988).
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wary criminal.' 10 4 The problem is that even after the Supreme
Court's reaffirmance that the key inquiry in entrapment claims fo-
cuses on the defendant's state of mind, the federal courts have been
unable to concur on how predisposition ought to be determined.10 5
B. Proving Predisposition Prior to Jacobson
Proof of predisposition is obtained by evaluating the defendant's
state of mind. This is done by introducing a variety of evidence. 10 6
Three rules of evidence are often employed in federal entrapment
cases as a means to admit or keep out evidence about the defendant's
predisposition. Rules 401 and 402 admit as relevant evidence that
makes the existence of a material fact more or less probable. 0 7 Rule
403 excludes evidence "if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... "o108 Predisposition
may be shown by many different types of evidence, provided that the
evidence comports with these rules. Evidence of prior convictions,
prior criminal activity or arrests, contemporaneous criminal activity,
post-offense criminal activity, and ready acceptance of the govern-
ment's offer to commit the crime have all been used to prove
predisposition. 10 9
Evidence of prior convictions, criminal activity, or arrests" 0 is usu-
ally admitted to prove predisposition in federal court cases."' For ex-
104. Id.
105. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
106. MARCUS, supra note 30, §4.14, at 141.
107. FED. R. EvID. 401. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable ...."; FED. R. EViD. 402. "All relevant evidence is admissible .... Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible." Id.
108. FED. R. EvID. 403.
109. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, MICHAEL CALLAHAN, ENTRAPMENT AND THE FEDERAL COURTS
37-48 (1984).
110. This type of evidence is admissible under FED. R. EVID. 404(b) which provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident ....
Id.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Walther, 867 F.2d 1334, 1343 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that an
arrest for possession of marijuana ten years prior was properly admissible to show predisposi-
tion); United States v. Paul, 810 F.2d 774, 776-77 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that evidence of prior
drug transactions was properly admissible to show predisposition); United States v. Franklin, 704
F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that evidence of prior assault was properly admissi-
ble to show motive); United States v. Marshall, 683 F.2d 1212, 1215 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that
evidence suggesting prior violations of the Food Stamp Act were properly admissible); United
States v. Engleman, 648 F.2d 473, 478-79 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that evidence of involvement in
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ample, in United States v. Simmons,112 the defendant was convicted for
unlawful distribution of heroin.113 The defendant argued that the gov-
ernment should not have been able to offer evidence of his previous
convictions for narcotics violations as evidence of predisposition. 114
The court of appeals held that this evidence was relevant and proba-
tive of the defendant's predisposition to engage in the distribution of
heroin.115 The court said that in attempting to prove predisposition,
the government may properly introduce evidence of the defendant's
prior criminal acts to show that the defendant had a propensity to
commit such crimes.116 However, under Rule 404(b), the evidence
would be inadmissible if the government tried to use it to prove that
the defendant committed the crime as a result of this propensity.11 7
Other federal courts have been more conservative in allowing the
introduction of prior criminal activity. In United States v. Blanken-
ship,118 the court held that the use of other criminal acts "'is a reliable
method of proving the criminal predisposition needed to rebut the al-
legation or inference of entrapment. "'19 The court noted that the ev-
idence of other criminal acts must "deal with conduct substantially
similar and reasonably near in time to the offenses for which the de-
fendant is being tried.' 20 In Blankenship, the defendant was found
guilty of unlawfully dealing in firearms, despite his claim that he was
entrapped.' 21 The issue on appeal was whether the court properly ad-
mitted tape recordings of the defendant's admission that he had also
purchased some stolen lawn equipment and lumber as evidence of
predisposition.' 22 The court decided that the other offenses should
not be admissible because they were not substantially similar and had
"little if any probative value with respect to the issue of his predisposi-
tion."'1 23 On the other hand, when a defendant is charged with posses-
death of business associate and the subsequent collection of insurance proceeds thirteen years
prior was properly admitted to show intent).
112. 663 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
113. Id. at 108.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
116. Id.
117. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, how-
ever, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity .... ).
118. 775 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1985).
119. Id. at 739 (quoting United States v. Salisbury, 662 F.2d 738, 741 (11th Cir. 1981)).
120. Id. (citing United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001, 1005 (6th Cir. 1975)).
121. Id. at 737.
122. Id. at 736-38.
123. Id. at 740.
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sion of marijuana, a prior conviction for heroin possession would
likely be considered similar; therefore, the evidence would be
admissible. 124
There is also a question of how close in time the prior act(s) must be
to the charged offense in order to be admissible to prove predisposi-
tion. In United States v. Engleman,125 the court stated that "there is no
absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate of-
fenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and ex-
amines the facts and circumstances of each case.' 12 6 Evidence of prior
acts that occurred more than ten years ago would be contradictory to
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b), which prohibits the use of prior con-
victions to impeach a witness's credibility when the conviction is more
than ten years old, unless the probative value substantially outweighs
the potential prejudice. Nonetheless, at least one court has admitted
evidence of criminal acts committed more than ten years earlier.127
Such evidence of prior criminal acts may properly be excluded
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 if the potential prejudice to the
defendant substantially outweighs the probative value of the evi-
dence. 128 In the context of entrapment claims, however, evidence of
prior acts will usually pass this test. "[C]aselaw suggests that evidence
of prior similar criminal acts is highly probative of a criminal predispo-
sition" and is usually not outweighed by a danger of prejudice. 129 As
the Court stated in Sorrells, a defendant cannot object to the possible
prejudice an inquiry into his past causes if he asserts the entrapment
defense.' 30
Moreover, the courts have allowed the prosecution to introduce evi-
dence of subsequent acts to show predisposition, subject to the same
type of restrictions placed on evidence of prior criminal acts.' 3' Such
evidence is admitted on the theory that defendant's continuation of
124. See United States v. Tyson, 470 F.2d 381, 384-85 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that prior
conviction for possession of heroin was properly admitted into evidence to show defendant was
predisposed to commit crime of possession of marijuana).
125. 648 F.2d 473, 479 (8th Cir. 1981).
126. Id. at 479.
127. See, e.g., id. (holding that thirteen year-old conviction was relevant).
128. FED. R. EvID. 403.
129. See Johnson, supra note 27, at 398-99.
130. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451-52 (1932); see United States v. Burkley, 591
F.2d 903, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that "once he admits he engaged in the illegal act, a
defendant is simply not in a position to be prejudiced should the jury infer from his commission
of other crimes that he committed the crime charged").
131. See, e.g., United States v. Mack, 643 F.2d 1119, 1121-22 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
evidence of subsequent criminal acts is properly admissible to prove predisposition); Burkley,
591 F.2d at 921-22 (holding that evidence of subsequent acts was properly admissible to show a
common plan or scheme).
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prohibited acts in instances absent government inducement may indi-
cate that it was not the government's inducement that motivated the
defendant to commit the act in question.132
The prosecution has also frequently relied on evidence of the de-
fendant's ready acceptance of the government's inducement to com-
mit the crime as evidence of predisposition. 33 In United States v.
Jannotti,134 the defendants were indicted on charges arising from their
unlawful receipt of money in exchange for the use of their political
power to support a hotel project in Philadelphia. 35 Although the jury
rejected the defendants' entrapment defense, the trial judges set aside
the verdict because the government's only evidence of predisposition
was the defendants' ready acceptance of the bribes. 36 The court of
appeals disagreed, holding that the evidence presented at trial estab-
lished that the defendants accepted the money "readily, unprotest-
ingly, even casually"; therefore, there was a substantial basis for the
jury's finding that the defendants were predisposed to commit the
crime.' 37
In United States v. Ulloaa38 the Second Circuit clearly articulated
that the entrapment defense must fail in any instance in which the
defendant is "willing" to commit the crime, regardless of whether or
not he would have engaged in criminal activity without government
inducement. 139 In Ulloa, the trial judge instructed the jurors "that the
Government had to prove that the defendant was predisposed, or
'ready and willing,' to commit the crime before the informant's in-
ducement.' 40 The jury sent notes to the judge several times asking
him to explain what "ready" means. 14' The judge stated that "'Ready'
132. Johnson, supra note 27, at 401.
133. See United States v. Ulloa, 882 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d
578 (3d Cir. 1982); see infra text accompanying notes 130-40.
134. 673 F.2d 578.
135. Id. at 581-89.
136. Id. at 597-98.
137. Id. at 606.
138. 882 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1989).
139. Id. at 44.
140. Id. at 43.
141. Id. at 43-44. After deliberating, the jurors sent the judge a note seeking answers to ques-
tions on entrapment. Id. The judge brought the jurors into the courtroom, at which time they
asked the following questions:
Does the defendant have to have in his mind before the government approaches him
that he is going to go and commit a crime?; What if a government agent encountered a
person and asked them if they were able to provide him with contacts for narcotics,
somebody that was interested in buying drugs asked someone else whether or not they
had any contacts, if that person said yes and they would be interested in dealing with
him, would that be inducing that person?; You did imply that there was a difference
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implies an open amenability to it. It is not terribly different from 'will-
ing.' The two of them together imply a certain amenability to be in-
volved in illegal conduct."'1 42 The defendant appealed the court's
interpretation of predisposition and asserted that "the Government
must prove the defendant was not only willing but also ready to com-
mit the crime, in the sense of having the present physical ability to do
so.' 143 The Second Circuit rejected this argument, stating that:
The focus of the entrapment inquiry, once inducement by the Gov-
ernment is established, is on the defendant's state of mind .... [In
the cases in which we found that the defendant was "fully prepared"
to act,] we noted the defendant's physical readiness in order to
demonstrate why the entrapment defense failed as a matter of law.
We did not say that the Government was required to prove readi-
ness in this sense to sustain its burden in proving disposition.' 44
Some courts have placed great emphasis on whether or not the de-
fendant readily responded to the inducement offered. In United States
v. Jones, 45 the Seventh Circuit held that "[t]he most important factor
for the court to focus upon is the defendant's reluctance to commit the
offense. Such reluctance is a good indicator that the government's ac-
tions motivated the defendant to commit the offense, thereby remov-
ing culpability from the defendant."'1 46 On occasion, the defendant's
lack of reluctance alone may be sufficient to prove predisposition. 47
Conversely, in instances where reluctance to commit the crime is
shown, the government has had a much more difficult time proving
predisposition. 148 In fact, the Supreme Court has allowed a defendant
to introduce evidence of his reluctance to engage in the crime in order
to show that he was entrapped. 149
between willingness, which I think is not an issue here, and readiness. Can you define
readiness with any more specificity?
Id. at 44.
142. Id. at 44.
143. Id.
144. Ulloa, 882 F.2d at 44.
145. 950 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1991).
146. Id. at 1314.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977). "[W]e have
found no case in which the defense of entrapment ... was successful where the defendant had
not indicated reluctance to engage in illegal activity." Id. at 1336 n.11.
148. MARCUS, supra note 30, § 4.13, at 144.
149. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958) (relying on the testimony of an
informant that "one request was not enough,... additional ones were necessary to overcome,
first, petitioner's refusal, then his evasiveness, and then his hesitancy in order to achieve capitu-
lation" in holding that defendant was entrapped as a matter of law).
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C. Jacobson v. United States
The most recent Supreme Court case dealing with the entrapment
defense was in 1992 in Jacobson v. United States.150 In Jacobson, the
defendant ordered two magazines entitled Bare Boys I and Bare Boys
If containing photos of nude teenage boys.151 At the time, his actions
were perfectly legal, but three months later, Congress passed 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A), which criminalized "the knowing receipt
through the mails of a visual depiction [that] involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct . "..."152 In that same
month, postal inspectors found Jacobson's name on a mailing list from
a California bookstore that indicated his earlier receipt of Bare Boys I
and Bare Boys 11.153 Government agents then began sending Jacob-
son letters from fictitious organizations in an attempt to solicit orders
for child pornography. 154 Some of these mailings were from organiza-
tions purporting to protect First Amendment rights with regard to
pornographic material.155 Jacobson enrolled in one of these organiza-
tions and filled out various questionnaires indicating that his interest
in "'[p]reteen sex-homosexual material"' was above average. 156 Fi-
nally, twenty-six months after the mailings commenced, the govern-
ment sent a letter inviting Jacobson to send for more information
about a method of receiving pornography "without prying eyes of
U.S. Customs seizing your mail."'1 57 The defendant responded and a
catalogue was sent to him from which he ordered a pornographic mag-
azine depicting young boys engaged in various sexual activities.158
Jacobson was arrested and indicted for violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(2)(A). 159
Although Jacobson raised the defense of entrapment at trial, he was
convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Ne-
braska of "knowingly receiving through the mails sexually explicit ma-
terial depicting a minor.' 160 Upon a rehearing en banc, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that there was sufficient evidence to
150. 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
151. Id. at 542-43.
152. Id. at 542.
153. Id. at 543.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 545.
156. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 544.
157. Id. at 546-47.
158. Id. at 547.
159. Id.
160. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 468 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 503 U.S. 554 (1992)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Supp. V 1987)).
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support the conviction and affirmed the trial court's decision.161 The
court held that "this is not a case in which the government was a man-
ufacturer rather than a detector of crime. 1 62 The court felt that "the
postal inspectors only provided Jacobson with opportunities to
purchase child pornography.' '1 63
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that Jacobson
was entrapped as a matter of law: "[r]ational jurors could not say be-
yond a reasonable doubt that petitioner possessed the requisite pre-
disposition prior to the Government's investigation and that it existed
independent of the Government's many and varied approaches to pe-
titioner.' 64 After considering Jacobson's background and character,
the majority held that he did not have a predisposition to commit the
crime. 165 In finding a lack of predisposition, the Court relied on the
fact that the defendant was an otherwise law-abiding citizen,166 with
the exception of a Driving While Under the Influence conviction in
1958.167
The majority opinion, written by Justice White, reiterated that when
the government has induced an individual to commit a crime and the
defendant raises the entrapment defense, the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to
commit that crime. 168 The majority opinion did not offer a test for
determining predisposition but noted that in this instance, the govern-
ment did not prove predisposition independent of government in-
volvement. 169 Justice White added that the defendant's ready
response to the government solicitations cannot be enough to estab-
lish that he was predisposed to commit the crime. 170 The Court con-
cluded that "[w]hen the Government's quest for convictions leads to
the apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his
own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law, the courts
should intervene.'' T
Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissent, criticized the majority's
approach, stating that "[t]he Court seems to add something new to the
161. Id. at 470.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 471.
168. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 548-49.
169. Id. at 550.
170. Id. at 553.
171. Id. at 553-54.
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burden of proving predisposition. Not only must the Government
show that a defendant was predisposed to engage in the illegal con-
duct ... but also that the defendant was predisposed to break the law
knowingly in order to do S0. ''172 The majority answered Justice
O'Connor in a footnote, stating that the dissent was mistaken in its
claim that this predisposition requirement is an "innovation in entrap-
ment law."'173
Justice O'Connor also argued that the majority altered the entrap-
ment defense by compelling a prosecutor to show that the defendant
possessed a predisposition prior to the government's first contact with
the defendant. 174  She stated:
The rule that preliminary Government contact can create a predis-
position has the potential to be misread by lower courts as well as
criminal investigators as requiring that the Government must have
sufficient evidence of a defendant's predisposition before it ever
seeks to contact him. Surely the Court cannot intend to impose such
a requirement, for it would mean that the Government must have a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before it begins an investi-
gation, a condition that we have never before imposed.175
D. The Circuit Split in the Wake of Jacobson
The circuit court decisions reflect confusion over the predisposition
requirement enunciated in Jacobson. Some courts have shifted to-
ward a heightened level of scrutiny in determining predisposition, re-
quiring that the government show that the defendant would have
engaged in the criminal activity without government inducement. 176
Other courts have held that Jacobson merely applied already existing
entrapment law and have found predisposition using traditional
factors.177
In United States v. Gendron,178 then First Circuit Chief Judge
Breyer held that Jacobson requires the government to show how a
defendant would have reacted had he been faced with an "ordinary
opportunity to commit the crime."'1 79 In Gendron, the government
found Gendron's name on a "naked children" mailing list and sent
172. Id. at 559-60. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 549 n.2.
174. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 556 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 557.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1199-1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 305
(1997).
178. 18 F.3d 955 (1st Cir. 1994).
179. Id. at 962-63.
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him pornography solicitations over a period of time.180 Upon first re-
ceiving a catalogue, he ordered two titles and included a letter indicat-
ing how excited he was to receive the material. 181 The government
did not fill that order, but three years later Gendron again responded
to a solicitation by ordering more pornography. 182 The third time the
government sent a child pornography catalogue, Gendron again
placed an order and later sent a letter illustrating his desire to receive
the materials. 83 This time the government sent the materials, and
Gendron was arrested. 184
After comparing the case with Jacobson, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals held that Gendron was not entrapped as a matter of law be-
cause the evidence revealed that Gendron "would have responded af-
firmatively to the most ordinary of opportunities, and hence, was
'predisposed' to commit the crime."'1 85 Judge Breyer opined that in
determining predisposition, courts cannot simply inquire whether the
defendant "would likely have committed the crime" without the gov-
ernment activity because if the government would not have presented
the opportunity, the defendant, no matter how predisposed, would
likely not have acted.' 86 Instead, "we should ask how the defendant
likely would have reacted to an ordinary opportunity to commit the
crime."'1 87 Judge Breyer defined ordinary as lacking "those special
features of the government's conduct that made of it an 'inducement',
or an 'overreaching.'" 88 He stated that asking the question in this
manner prevents one from concluding simply from the fact that the
defendant committed the crime that he was predisposed to do so.189
He opined that the Court's decision in Jacobson to find entrapment as
a matter of law was a result of the government's failure to "show how
Jacobson would have acted had he been faced with an ordinary 'op-
portunity' to commit the crime rather than a special 'inducement."' 90
The majority held that Gendron was predisposed to commit the
crime based on the evidence, which in its opinion, revealed an enthusi-
180. Id. at 964.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. In the letter he asked "if the firm had 'forgotten' his order, making clear that he still
wanted 'this type of educational materials,' stating, 'don't worry, I am not connected in any way
with law enforcement,' and adding 'Please Hurry."' Id.
184. Gendron, 18 F.3d at 964.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 962.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 963.
190. Gendron, 18 F.3d at 963.
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astic participant who continuously responded to government solicita-
tions "far less extensive than in Jacobson."191 This enthusiasm was
displayed under the most ordinary of opportunities, and unlike Jacob-
son, he was not solicited under a guise of an anti-censorship plan.192
Such evidence that a defendant would commit the crime in the most
ordinary of opportunities, in the majority's opinion, shows that Gen-
dron was predisposed to commit the crime, which defeats his claim of
entrapment. 193
Other circuits did not share Breyer's interpretation of the Jacobson
decision. In United States v. Hollingsworth,194 Judge Posner, writing
for the Seventh Circuit, interpreted the "something new" aspect of
predisposition that Justice O'Connor alluded to in her dissent in
Jacobson as requiring that a defendant be in a "position" to have actu-
ally committed the crime without government involvement. 195 In Hol-
lingsworth, the defendants were an orthodontist and a farmer who had
failed at numerous business ventures. 196 They decided to become in-
ternational financiers, but they had no customers and were rapidly los-
ing all their money. 197 One of the defendants placed an advertisement
in the USA Today offering to sell one of the foreign banking licenses
he had obtained. 98 A United States customs agent saw the ad and
assumed that someone who dealt with foreign banks might be some-
one who would be interested in laundering money.199 The agent then
contacted Pickard, the defendant, about depositing money offshore.200
At first, Pickard suggested legal methods of depositing the money but
later suggested illegal ways in which he could structure the deposit to
avoid federal reporting requirements. 20' In the alternative, Pickard
suggested that the agent could deposit the money outside of the
United States.202 At this point the agent initiated "a formal investiga-
tion to determine the past and present unlawful activities of William
Pickard," which revealed no prior activities.20 3 Later, Pickard re-
tracted his suggestion that the money be deposited outside the United
191. Id. at 964.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 9 F.3d 593 (7th Cir.), affd on reh'g, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).






201. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200-01.
202. Id. at 1201.
203. Id.
1999]
970 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:949
States because it was illegal; thus, there was no evidence that Pickard
knew that structuring a deposit to avoid federal reporting require-
ments also violated the law.20 4 After about six months, the agent con-
tacted Pickard again and gave him $20,000, which he said came from
gun smuggling.20 5 Pickard took that money and also participated in
subsequent transactions totaling $200,000.206 Hollingsworth was also
involved in these dealings.20 7 Finally, when the defendants again at-
tempted to launder another large sum of money, they were ar-
rested.208 The district court rejected a defense of entrapment as a
matter of law. 209
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the district court's holding and acquitted both defendants.210
The court held that the government essentially "turned two harmless,
though weak, foolish, and in Pickard's case at least, greedy, men into
felons" by entrapping them.211 The court based this decision on the
Supreme Court's holding in Jacobson, which it believed significantly
changed the entrapment defense. 212 Judge Posner argued vehemently
that Jacobson illustrates that predisposition cannot be judged accu-
rately simply from the defendant's response to governmental induce-
ments. 21 3 Judge Posner pointed out that if the Court in Jacobson
believed that an adequate showing of predisposition can be achieved




207. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1201.
208. Id.
209. United States v. Hollingsworth, 9 F.3d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1993).
210. Id. at 602.
211. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1202.
212. Id. at 1198. The majority stated that "Cases both in this and in other circuits, besides the
panel decision in this case, recognize that Jacobson has changed the landscape of the entrapment
defense." Id.
213. Id. at 1199. Judge Posner stated:
We put the following hypothetical case to the government's lawyer at the reargument.
Suppose the government went to someone and asked him whether he would like to
make money as a counterfeiter, and the reply was, "Sure, but I don't know anything
about counterfeiting." Suppose the government then brought him a printer, paper, and
ink, showed him how to make the counterfeit money, hired a staff for him, and got
everything set up so that all he had to do was press a button to print the money; and
then offered him $10,000 for some quantity of counterfeit bills. The government's law-
yer acknowledged that the counterfeiter would have a strong case that he had been
entrapped, even though he was perfectly willing to commit the crime once the govern-
ment planted the suggestion and showed him how and the government neither
threatened him nor offered him an overwhelming inducement.
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crime, then Jacobson would have been predisposed.2 14 The govern-
ment did not have to badger Jacobson to overcome his resistance to
committing the crime.2 15 In fact, he never actually resisted. 216 If
Jacobson were predisposed, then the Court's decision would be diffi-
cult to explain.217
Judge Posner made it clear that he wasn't suggesting that Jacobson
adds a new element to the entrapment defense. Instead, he stated
that the Court "clarified the meaning of predisposition. '21 8 Posner
stated:
Predisposition is not a purely mental state, the state of being willing
to swallow the government's bait. It has positional as well as dispo-
sitional force .... The defendant must be so situated by reason of
previous training or experience or occupation or acquaintances that
it is likely that if the government had not induced him to commit the
crime some criminal would have done so; only then does a sting or
other arranged crime take a dangerous person out of circulation....
It is different when the defendant is not in a position without the
government's help to become involved in illegal activity. The gov-
ernment "may not provoke or create a crime, and then punish the
criminal, its creature.121 9
The court felt that the defendants would not have been in the position
to commit the criminal acts if it were not for the government's in-
volvement.220 Accordingly, the government failed to satisfy its burden
of proof because a criminal predisposition produced by the govern-
ment's activities cannot defeat a claim of entrapment. 221
Judge Posner also made it clear that the court was not of the opin-
ion that a "lack of present means to commit a crime is alone enough to
establish entrapment if the government supplies the means. '222 In a
case where the defendant already had the idea for the crime but
lacked the means to commit it, and the government provided those
means, the entrapment defense would fail because the defendant was




217. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1199.
218. Id. at 1200.
219. Id. (citation omitted).
220. Id. at 1202.
221. Id. at 1203.
222. Id. at 1202.
223. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1202-03.
Suppose that before Hinch chanced on the scene (for Jacobson makes clear, as we have
noted, that a predisposition created by the government cannot be used to defeat a de-
fense of entrapment), Pickard had decided to smuggle arms to Cuba but didn't know
where to buy a suitable boat. On a hunch, a government agent sidles up to Pickard and
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dercover operations are appropriate in instances where the person
would have committed a crime absent government inducement, but
the government officers are able to induce the person to commit the
crime now in order that they may apprehend and convict the per-
son.224 As Judge Posner stated, "[t]he defense of entrapment reflects
the view that the proper use of the criminal law in a society such as
ours is to prevent harmful conduct for the protection of the law abid-
ing, rather than to purify thoughts and perfect character. '225
Judge Ripple, writing a dissenting opinion, saw things quite differ-
ently.2 2 6 He stated that the government "departed radically from the
established law of this circuit, and, more importantly, from the gov-
erning precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States. ' 227 He
protested that the majority's "positional" predisposition test added a
new element to the entrapment defense by requiring that the govern-
ment establish the defendant's "readiness" to commit the crime. 22
Although readiness had been employed in the past, 229 Judge Ripple
argued that the majority changed the meaning of "ready" from "one
who is inclined, feeling or exhibiting no reluctance, to one on the point
of acting. '230 In doing so, the majority has departed from controlling
caselaw and well-settled precedent.231 In his view, a showing of "read-
gives him the address of a boat dealer; and Pickard is arrested after taking possession of
the boat and setting sail, and is charged with attempted smuggling. That would be a
case in which the defendant had the idea for the crime all worked out and lacked
merely the present means to commit it, and if the government had not supplied them
someone else very well might have. It would be a case in which the government had




A person who is likely to commit a particular type of crime without being induced to do
so by government agents, although he would not have committed it when he did but for
the inducement, is a menace to society and a proper target of law enforcement. The
likelihood that he has committed this type of crime in the past or will do so in the
future is great, and by arranging for him to commit it now, in circumstances that enable
the government to apprehend and convict him, the government punishes or prevents
real criminal activity. The government's inducement affects the timing of the offense; it
does not create the offense by exploiting the susceptibility of a weak-minded person.
Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1213.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1214.
229. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1215 (citing Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550
(1992)); see United States. v. Kussmaul, 987 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Tejeda, 974 F.2d 210, 217-18 (1st Cir. 1992).
230. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1215 (emphasis added).
231. Id.
1999] VICTIM OR THE CRIME? 973
iness" was no more than "circumstantial evidence that is relative and
probative evidence of whether defendant was in fact predisposed to
commit the offense. '232
In United States v. Thickstun,233 the Ninth Circuit adopted yet an-
other approach to the government's burden in proving predisposition.
In that case, an IRS agent was investigating John Nazaroff's unpaid
taxes with total liability estimated at $785,000.234 "During the audit,
Nazaroff offered [the agent] a modeling job, which [he] perceived as a
bribe overture. '235 The agent notified his superior, took a bribery
awareness course, and began surveillance.236 Ultimately, Nazaroff of-
fered the agent $5,000 to "zero out" his tax liability.237 He also asked
the agent to help his friend Charlot Thickstun who owed the IRS
$476,000 in unpaid taxes including interest and penalties.238 Unlike
Nazaroff, Thickstun had begun an offer and compromise process with
the IRS but had not yet reached a settlement. 239 She had retained an
attorney and planned to meet her tax obligations before she was ap-
proached by Nazaroff with the agent's offer to accept a bribe in return
for reducing her tax liability to zero. 240 When Nazaroff first contacted
her with this offer, Thickstun declined. 241 When the agent contacted
Thickstun, she explained to the agent that she was in a bad financial
situation.242 The agent then suggested that Thickstun get the money
back from her tax attorney to finance the bribe.243 The agent stated
that Thickstun could make monthly payments for the difference, and
Thickstun finally agreed.244 The agent recorded these conversations,
232. Id. at 1214.
233. 110 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 305 (1997).





239. Thickstun, 110 F.3d at 1396.
240. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, at 9, Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394 (citation omitted).
241. Id. at 8 (citations ommitted). Nazaroff told the undercover agent that: "[A]s far as
Chariot goes, though, she doesn't know that she wants to do anything now because she doesn't
have a job. She's caring for her mother who as brain cancer. She's kind of in a destitute situa-
tion right now." Id.
242. Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
243. Id. (citations omitted). The agent stated: "[J]ust go ahead and say WELL, I's gonna try it
this WAY. Uh, you've already done the paperwork on a [sic] audit reconsideration and I'm, uh,
already working on it and that you wanna try it on your own for a while, and, uh, if you can't get
things straightened out that you'll, uh, retain him later." Id.
244. Id. at 10 (citations omitted) The agent said "[I]f you could go ahead and give me three
[thousand dollars] when we sign the report and zero out all your taxes, okay, and then, uh, leave,
yeah, just small monthly payments." Id.
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and as a result, both Thickstun and Nazaroff were arrested and
charged with "bribery of a public official. ' 245 Thickstun argued that
she had been entrapped as a matter of law on two grounds. First, she
argued that the government induced the crime.246 Second, Thickstun
argued that she lacked the predisposition to commit bribery.247
The court was not completely forthright in its description of the
background facts of the case. The court stated that "[Thickstun] of-
fered to pay [the agent] $4,000 up front and $1,000 later, if he would
do the same thing for her that he had done for Nazaroff. ' '248 The
court failed to mention that when Nazaroff first contacted Thickstun
with this offer, she declined. The court also failed to mention that
Thickstun initially explained to the agent that she was in a bad finan-
cial situation and that it was the agent who suggested that she stop
working with her tax attorney and use the retainer money to finance
the bribe.249 As will be illustrated, such facts become important when
the issue of predisposition is examined under the Hollingsworth and
the Gendron approaches.
If Thickstun's case had been heard in the Seventh Circuit, the gov-
ernment would have had to prove not only that the defendant pos-
sessed the mental state, or disposition, to commit the crime but also
that the defendant was in a "position" to commit the crime.250 In-
stead, the Ninth Circuit applied a different standard, which requires
the government to prove predisposition by way of a multi-element test
in which the fact-finder must analyze: "(1) the defendant's character
and reputation; (2) whether the government initially suggested the
criminal activity; (3) whether the defendant engaged in the activity for
profit; (4) whether the defendant showed any reluctance; and (5) the
nature of the government's inducement."'251 This standard had previ-
ously been applied by other courts as well.252




249. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 9, Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394 (citations omitted).
250. See supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
251. Thickstun, 110 F.3d at 1396 (citation omitted).
252. The Eighth Circuit also adopted a multi-element test in United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d
674, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). The court identified 10
factors to be evaluated in determining predisposition:
(1) whether the defendant readily responded to the inducement offered; (2) the circum-
stances surrounding the illegal conduct; (3) the state of mind of a defendant before the
government agents make any suggestion that he shall commit a crime; (4) whether the
defendant was engaged in an existing course of conduct similar to the crime for which
he is charged; (5) whether the defendant had already formed the "design" to commit
the crime for which he is charged; (6) the defendant's reputation; (7) the conduct of the
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In rejecting Thickstun's arguments to the contrary, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that she was not entrapped as a matter of law.253 The
court held that a jury could conclude that the defendant was predis-
posed to commit the crime based on the facts of the case: (1) Thick-
stun owed almost half a million dollars to the IRS; (2) the jury heard
wiretapped conversations between Thickstun and the agent in which
Thickstun broached the topic of bribery; (3) she did not dispute that
she engaged in the activity for profit; and (4) she showed no reluc-
tance to commit the crime. 254 The court relied most heavily on the
defendant's lack of reluctance to commit the crime, commenting on
the "receptivity" she expressed in her conversations with the agent.255
The court was unpersuaded by the fact that Thickstun's eagerness to
commit the crime arose after the agent had met her, stating that "the
jury could rely on it to find that she was already predisposed to com-
mit the crime. '256
In reaching its decision, the court also rejected the notion that in
determining predisposition, Supreme Court precedent requires a
showing that the defendant was in a position to commit the crime,
absent any government assistance.257 Instead, the court concluded
that such an interpretation would unnecessarily expand the entrap-
ment defense by making a person's ability to commit a crime a sepa-
rate element to be proven.258 The court held that Jacobson does not
create "a requirement of positional readiness" but instead applied
"settled entrapment law."' 259
In sum, the federal courts have articulated at least three different
standards for proving predisposition. The First Circuit has adopted
the "ordinary opportunity" test, meaning that the government must
only show that absent government inducement, the defendant would
have committed the crime if he had been faced with an "ordinary op-
portunity. ' 260 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has adopted a
"positional" test, which requires the government to prove not only
defendant during negotiations with the undercover agent; (8) whether the defendant
has refused to commit similar acts on other occasions; (9) the nature of the crime
charged; (10) the degree of coercion present in the instigation law officers have contrib-
uted to the transaction relative to the defendant's criminal background.
Id. at 687-88 (citations omitted).




257. Id. at 1398.
258. Id.
259. Thickstun, 110 F.3d at 1398.
260. See supra notes 178-93 and accompanying text.
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that the defendant possessed the mental state, or disposition, to com-
mit the crime but also that the defendant was in a position to commit
the crime.261 This requires the defendant to be able and likely, based
on experience, training, and contacts, to commit the crime. Finally,
the Ninth Circuit has adopted a multi-element test in which the court
looks to a variety of relevant facts in determining predisposition.2 62
II. ANALYSIS
The entrapment defense arose from the need to protect the "other-
wise law-abiding citizen" from government officials who might prey
upon their needs and weaknesses in order to persuade them to com-
mit crimes.263 Without the entrapment defense, there would not be
enough restriction on the government, meaning that it would be free
to go out and create crime by corrupting the innocent. The role of the
court then is to protect the government itself from the illegal acts of its
officers. 264 The courts fail in this role when they find that the govern-
ment has satisfied its burden of proving predisposition in instances
"[w]hen the government's quest for convictions leads to the apprehen-
sion of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices,
likely would have never run afoul of the law... "265 Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court has declined to define how courts can make this deter-
mination by refusing to settle the split in the federal circuits regarding
what constitutes proof of predisposition. 266
The manner in which courts are determining predisposition has def-
initely changed in light of Supreme Court precedent, especially Jacob-
son. Some courts have begun to place the notion of predisposition in
proper context by inquiring whether the defendant likely would have
committed the crime without government involvement, rather than
merely inquiring whether the defendant was an enthusiastic partici-
pant.267 As the Hollingsworth court noted:
What is true is that until the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Jacobson .... the courts of appeals had been drifting toward the
view .. .that the defense of entrapment must fail in any case in
261. See supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
263. Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928).
264. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp 1182, 1187 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (discussing Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446 (1932)).
265. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992).
266. Compare United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994) (adopting the view
that a person must have been in the position to commit the crime in question prior to govern-
ment inducement) with United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 305 (1997) (adopting varying approaches for determining predisposition).
267. Marcus, supra note 24, at 230.
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which the defendant is "willing," in the sense of being psychologi-
cally prepared, to commit the crime for which he is being prose-
cuted, even if it is plain that he would not have engaged in criminal
activity unless "inveigled or assisted by the government. 268
The circuit court decisions interpreting the definition of predisposi-
tion provided in Jacobson are still divided. An examination of each of
the different approaches reveals the disparities between the circuits
and a lack of consistent legal analysis present in determining whether
the defendants were entrapped as a matter of law.269 It appears that
defendants such as Thickstun, who if left to her own devices likely
would have "never run afoul of the law," are on the losing end of
these divided opinions.270
A. The Positional Test
In many cases, the Ninth Circuit's failure to require the government
to prove that the defendant was in a position to commit the crime
would not alter the defendant's opportunity to successfully claim en-
trapment.271 If the government's only involvement was to provide an
opportunity to accept a bribe, then the defendant was probably in a
"position" to offer a bribe anyway and was therefore not lacking pre-
disposition. When the government, however, deliberately targets an
individual, and its involvement was greater than simply creating an
opportunity to commit the crime, the person may not have been in a
position to commit the crime. Courts are therefore unable to con-
268. Hollingsworth, 27 F.2d at 1198 (citations omitted).
269. See, e.g., United States v. Knox, 112 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 1997) overruled by United States v.
Brace, 145 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The Fifth Circuit initially held that a preacher
was entrapped as a matter of law because the government did not prove that he was "likely to
engage in money laundering absent the government's conduct." Id. at 804. The court recog-
nized that Judge Posner's interpretation of Jacobson has not been embraced by all of the circuits
but nonetheless was persuaded that Hollingsworth was correctly decided. Id. at 808 (citations
omitted). Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that "[t]he Supreme Court instructs that in deter-
mining predisposition we are to ask what the defendant would have done absent government
involvement." Id. The court further noted that in order "[t]o give effect to that command, we
must look not only to the defendant's mental state (his 'disposition'), but also to whether the
defendant was able and likely, based on experience, training and contacts, to actually commit the
crime (his 'position')." Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed this ruling on rehearing en banc. Brace,
145 F.3d at 250. The new panel refused to consider whether a "positional predisposition" ele-
ment was required, claiming that the defendant did not present such a claim to the district court
or the appellate court. Id. at 259-60. Instead, the court applied the "well-established and under-
stood precedent as to entrapment" and found that the evidence at trial was sufficient for a ra-
tional juror to concluded that Brace was predisposed to launder money. Id. at 247, 265.
270. Compare Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196 (adopting the view that the person must have been
in position to commit the crime in question prior to government inducement) with Thickstun,
110 F.3d 1934 (adopting varying approaches for determining predisposition).
271. Thickstun, 110 F.3d at 1394.
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clude that the defendant is an "unwary criminal" rather than an "un-
wary innocent" victim. It is in these instances that the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of predisposition does not afford sufficient protection
to criminal defendants.
While the court in Thickstun relied heavily on the defendant's lack
of reluctance, 272 a better inquiry would have been whether the de-
fendant was in a position to commit the crime prior to government
involvement. After all, many people in Thickstun's financial distress,
would not display reluctance to the idea of eliminating a debt totaling
nearly a half a million dollars simply by paying an IRS agent $5,000.
This lack of reluctance alone should not be sufficient evidence that a
debtor would actually bribe an agent. As Justice O'Connor suggested
in her dissent, the significance of Jacobson lies in the adoption of a
requirement that the government show that the defendant was predis-
posed prior to the government's first contact.2 73 By examining a de-
fendant's reluctance in an attempt to show predisposition, the
government is utilizing evidence of the defendant's actual reaction to
the government's first contact. It seems that such an examination runs
contrary to the requirement that the government establish predisposi-
tion "prior to the Government acts intended to create predispo-
sition. "274
The positional predisposition element is essential because the differ-
ence between committing a crime and obeying the law is, in part,
whether the individual has the capacity to commit the crime. Despite
a willingness to commit a crime, most people rarely break the law. If
this is true, then in order to distinguish the otherwise innocent defend-
ant from the unwary criminal, courts should require the government
to establish that the defendant had the capacity to commit the crime.
The Supreme Court recognized as early as 1958 that effective law en-
forcement does not require the government to play on the weaknesses
of an otherwise innocent defendant.275 The government has not been
assigned the task of originating criminal design, implanting the dispo-
sition in the mind of an otherwise innocent person, and then inducing
that person to commit the crime.
After looking at the Supreme Court's decision in Jacobson, it seems
clear that had the Supreme Court believed that a finding of predispo-
sition could be "made by the demonstrated willingness of the defend-
272. Id. at 1397.
273. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 n.2 (1992).
274. Id. at 552.
275. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958).
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ant," it would have concluded that Jacobson was predisposed.276 "The
government did not offer Jacobson any inducements to buy porno-
graphic magazines or threaten him with harm if he failed to buy them.
It was not as if the government had had to badger Jacobson for 26
months in order to overcome his resistance to committing a crime. He
never resisted. '277 Jacobson appeared to the Court to be that "other-
wise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would
have never run afoul of the law."'278 Thus, the emphasis was not on
Jacobson's willingness but rather on his mental state prior to govern-
ment inducements.
The Court stated that "[w]hen the Government's quest for convic-
tions leads to the apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen
who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of
the law, the courts should intervene. '279 The problem is that the
Court failed to articulate how to determine just who might be that
"otherwise law-abiding citizen" by failing to outline how predisposi-
tion should be determined. It appears that the key inquiry is whether
the defendant is someone who, without government contact, "likely
would have never run afoul of the law."'280 Beyond that, the Court has
not spoken on how to determine if a defendant is such a person.
In answering such questions, one must remember that the goal is to
protect the otherwise law-abiding citizens from government officials
who stand ready to prey upon their needs and weaknesses in attempts
to persuade them to commit crimes.281 Such citizens do not pose a
threat to society and therefore are not proper subjects of criminal
charges. When a government official actually implants the disposition
in the mind of an otherwise innocent person and induces that person
to commit the crime, the courts must protect that person from prose-
cution. As Thickstun illustrates, the Supreme Court has yet to protect
the "otherwise innocent person" because it has failed to articulate a
method of determining predisposition that will reliably provide such
protection.
Judge Posner's reasoning that proof that the defendant was predis-
posed to commit the crime must contain a "positional" element ap-
pears to be the most successful at separating the "unwary innocent"
from the "unwary criminal. ' 282 It provides real protection because it
276. Hollingsworth v. United States, 27 F.3d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1994).
277. Id.
278. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54.
279. Id.
280. Marcus, supra note 24, at 231.
281. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54.
282. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
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inquires into whether the defendant would have committed the crime
if the government had not been involved. This is workable because if
a defendant is only able to commit the crime when the government
steps in and provides the means to do so, then a court cannot really
find that he is a dangerous individual who should be punished.2 83 This
conclusion comports with the Supreme Court's first analysis of the en-
trapment defense in Sorrells.284 In Sorrells, the court said that:
[I]t is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the estab-
lished law of the land to punish a man for the commission of an
offense of the like of which he had never been guilty, either in
thought or in deed, and evidently never would have been guilty of it
if the officers of the law had not inspired, incited, persuaded, and
lured him to attempt to commit it.285
The Hollingsworth decision has been sharply criticized by both
judges and legal scholars on the grounds that allowing readiness to
become an independent element of the entrapment defense would be
extremely burdensome for law enforcement officials.286 Some argue
that "[i]t will create a new obstacle that the government will have to
satisfy, above and beyond the requirement of proving predisposi-
tion. ' 287 In actuality, the government should have to show that the
defendant was in a "position" to have actually committed the crime
without government involvement, in order to prove that he would
have committed the crime without government involvement. One
who was not in a position to do so can hardly be said to have been
predisposed. This may only be considered a new obstacle because it
had not been articulated before Hollingsworth, but in fact, it has been
a requirement since the Court's decision in Sherman. Without such a
requirement, there would be difficulty in separating the "unwary inno-
cent" from the "unwary criminal. '288
The failure to recognize that determining positional predisposition
is necessary in order to separate the "unwary innocent" from the "un-
wary criminal" has produced detrimental results. Had the Ninth Cir-
cuit applied Justice Posner's "positional" test in United States v.
283. See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200.
284. See supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
285. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1932) (quoting Butts v. United States, 273
F. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921)).
286. See, e.g., Elliot Rothstein, United States v. Hollingsworth: The Entrapment Defense and
the Neophyte Criminal-When the Commission of a Criminal Act Does Not Constitute a Crime,
17 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 303 (1995); Lori J. Rankin, Comment, Entrapment: A Defense for the
Willing, Yet Unready, Criminal?, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1487 (1995).
287. Rothstein, supra note 286, at 330 (reaching the conclusion that the Hollingsworth deci-
sion creates a new independent element of readiness to the entrapment defense).
288. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
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Thickstun,289 it likely would not have concluded that Thickstun was
predisposed to commit the crime. In fact, she was in the process of
working with the government to reach a settlement when she was first
approached by the agent. Regardless of whatever desire Thickstun
may have had to eliminate her debt with a small bribe, she was not in
a "position" to commit the crime before the government official ap-
proached her. She made no attempt to nefariously contact or culti-
vate a relationship with an IRS agent; to the contrary, she retained a
lawyer through whom all communications and settlements offers were
coordinated. 290 The result in this case illustrates that the entrapment
defense has seemingly failed to shield from prosecution those defend-
ants who were not predisposed to commit the criminal act but com-
mitted the crime only because of government involvement.
While Justice Posner seems to articulate an appropriate test for de-
termining predisposition, the positional predisposition test has been
criticized because it is not applicable in all instances.291 It does not
apply to bribery cases in which a defendant attempts to bribe an IRS
agent, for in those instances a defendant would never be in a position
to bribe the IRS without government involvement.292 The validity of
this criticism is illustrated when applying Justice Posner's test to the
Thickstun case. Courts could inquire as to whether Thickstun was in a
"position" to commit the crime, but then courts could never say that
she would be in a "position" to bribe the IRS without governmental
assistance. The criminal act of bribing a public official inherently in-
cludes acts of a government official. In that sense, Justice Posner's
assertion that a defendant is only "predisposed" if he is actually in a
position to commit the crime without government assistance 293 could
not be applicable to the crime of bribing a public official. The "posi-
tional" approach to predisposition is not, as illustrated above, without
merit. The Supreme Court, however, should not adopt this as the only
test for predisposition because it would not be applicable in all
instances.
289. 110 F.3d 1394.
290. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
291. See, e.g., Thickstun, 110 F.3d at 1398.
292. Id. ("Such a rule would be especially problematic in bribery cases. A person is never
'positionally' able to bribe a public official without cooperation from that official.").
293. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994).
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B. The Ordinary Opportunity Test
The test Justice Breyer articulated in United States v. Gendron 94
added an important inquiry into how the defendant would have acted
under ordinary circumstance. This inquiry, however, failed to find
that Jacobson required a positional element in determining predispo-
sition. Justice Breyer suggested that all Jacobson stands for is that the
government may not, in its attempts to induce the target of a sting to
commit a crime, confront him with circumstances that are different
from the ordinary circumstances of a private inducement. 295 Essen-
tially, the court thought that the government's attempt to persuade
Jacobson by enticing him with First Amendment rights, had departed
from typicality. This analysis is questionable because the circum-
stances that Jacobson faced may not have departed from typicality.
As the Hollingsworth court recognized, "[j]ust as the gun industry
likes to wrap itself in the mantle of the Second Amendment, so the
pornography industry likes to wrap itself in the mantle of the First
Amendment. ' 296 Nonetheless, persuasive political writings can often
make a weak person, who is repeatedly told by society that his weak-
nesses are wrong and immoral, think that he is in fact normal and
participating in what should be a lawful activity.
Justice Breyer does, however, offer an important consideration that
should not be discounted when determining predisposition. His ap-
proach requires the government to show that a defendant would have
committed the crime when "faced with an ordinary 'opportunity' to
commit the crime rather than a special 'inducement.' 297 Such an ap-
proach would discourage the government from preying upon the
needs and weaknesses of an otherwise innocent citizen by approach-
ing him with "indecent proposals," to convince him to commit a crimi-
nal act so the government can then prosecute. If someone would not
likely commit the crime under ordinary circumstances, but did so be-
cause of the extraordinary opportunities offered by government offi-
cials, he does not likely pose the sort of threat to society that the
government seeks to stop.
An application of the ordinary opportunity test instead of the posi-
titional test will likely lead to the same result in many instances. 298 In
294. 18 F.3d 955 (1st Cir. 1994).
295. Id. at 962.
296. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1199.
297. Gendron, 18 F.3d at 963.
298. See, e.g., United States v. Knox, 112 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that the result would
remain the same under the Gendron approach, although the court relied on the Hollingsworth
approach in reaching its conclusion).
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fact, if the Ninth Circuit applied the ordinary opportunity test to the
Thickstun case, it would likely conclude that the government failed to
show predisposition. The government's evidence in Thickstun did not
show how she would have acted had she been faced with an ordinary
"opportunity" to commit the crime rather than a special inducement.
In fact, Thickstun's initial decision to retain a lawyer and engage in
lawful settlement negotiations shows that when left to her own de-
vices, she would never have run afoul of the law. Furthermore, Thick-
stun was offered complete discharge from a tax liability of a little less
than half a million dollars for the price of $5,000.299 This can hardly
be deemed an ordinary opportunity. It would 'be better classified as
an "indecent proposal" rather than an ordinary inducement. 300 Ap-
plying the ordinary opportunity analysis to the Thickstun case would
clearly lead to the conclusion that the government failed to prove that
she was predisposed to commit the crime.
C. Proposal: Utilization of Both the "Positional Predisposition" and
"Ordinary Circumstances" Approaches in Determining Predisposition
As both the majority and dissent in Hollingsworth acknowledge,
Jacobson clearly stands for the proposition that predisposition goes
beyond the mental state of the defendant. 30 1 The Jacobson Court held
that predisposition must be established both before and independent
of the government investigation. 30 2 As the Jacobson Court held, the
entrapment defense should prevail when a "law-abiding citizen who, if
left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the
law. '303 This phrase, when read in conjunction with the court's hold-
ing that predisposition must be established before and independent of
any government involvement, suggests that the Court is no longer
amenable to a finding of a willingness to act, or an absence of reluc-
tance on the part of the defendants, as determinative of
predisposition.
As part of the evaluation of predisposition, courts should look at
the defendant's background and inquire as to both whether the de-
fendant was in a "position" to commit the crime and how the defend-
ant would have acted in the most "ordinary of circumstances." The
first part of the test requires the court to examine whether the defend-
299. United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 305
(1997).
300. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
301. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992); Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1199.
302. Rothstein, supra note 286, at 331.
303. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54.
1999]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ant was in a "position" to commit the crime, omitting the requirement
that he be in that position without government involvement. As seen
in bribery of public official cases, some crimes could never theoreti-
cally be committed without government involvement. 30 4 Instead, the
courts should focus on whether the defendant was able and likely to
commit the crime. A determination of whether the defendant was
able to commit the crime should be based on the factors that Judge
Posner articulated: his experience, training and contacts. 30 5 A deter-
mination of whether he was likely to commit the crime would, in turn,
focus on what type of activity the defendant was engaged in prior to
government contact.
The second part of the test, identical to that articulated by Justice
Breyer,30 6 would inquire whether the defendant would have reacted in
the same manner when faced with an "ordinary opportunity" to com-
mit that crime. As Justice Breyer pointed out, this determination is
essential because it prevents the court from concluding that the de-
fendant was predisposed to commit the crime simply from the fact
that the defendant committed the crime. 30 7 This inquiry would pre-
vent the government from proving predisposition in instances where it
does not have evidence that the person would have committed a crime
under ordinary circumstances. In essence, it prohibits the government
from proving predisposition with evidence of the defendant's response
to indecent proposals. This inquiry is also critical in preventing gov-
ernment officials from continually preying upon the needs and weak-
nesses of otherwise law-abiding citizens and offering extraordinary
opportunities in order to persuade them to commit crimes.
D. Impact
The many approaches to defining predisposition have left the doc-
trine of entrapment in a constant state of flux. The federal courts are
currently split over how predisposition ought to be determined; how-
ever, the Supreme Court has stubbornly refused to mandate how pre-
disposition ought to be determined.30 8 As illustrated in Thickstun, this
could result in cases being decided on geography rather than legal
analysis. Furthermore, no court has yet advanced an adequate ap-
proach that will accurately separate the "unwary innocent" from the
304. See supra notes 291-93 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 178-93 and accompanying text.
307. United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 963 (1st Cir. 1994).
308. See, e.g., United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 305
(1997).
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"unwary criminal" in all instances. The hybrid approach proposed
will protect that "otherwise law-abiding citizen" by examining
whether the defendant was in a "position" to commit the crime and
how the defendant would have acted in the most "ordinary of
circumstances."
This approach avoids the weakness of the Hollingsworth approach
because it will be applicable in all cases and also prohibits the govern-
ment from enticing an individual by creating "extraordinary circum-
stances." Under this test, a claim of entrapment by a defendant like
Thickstun, who was not in a position to commit a crime prior to the
inducement by the government official, would not be defeated on a
finding that she was predisposed. Moreover, the government would
be forbidden to prey upon the needs and weaknesses of an "otherwise
law-abiding citizen" by offering him opportunities outside the most
"ordinary of circumstances," thereby persuading him to commit a
crime.
The adoption of such an approach could not rationally be said to
lead to more crime,309 nor will it flood the courts with more litigation.
This approach will not be burdensome for the law enforcement com-
munity.310 By adopting it, the Supreme Court would end the confu-
sion among the federal courts on how predisposition ought to be
determined. The approach would comport with Supreme Court pre-
cedent that mandates protection of the "law-abiding citizen who, if
left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the
law." 311 This hybrid approach to determining entrapment would pro-
tect law abiding citizens by defeating an entrapment defense only
when the defendant was predisposed to commit a crime in instances
where a defendant was in a position to commit a crime, and where the
government can show that he would have acted in a criminal manner
under the most ordinary of circumstances. The Court's failure to do
so has already resulted in inconsistencies in federal court decisions.
CONCLUSION
The entrapment defense was established as a safeguard to protect
the otherwise law-abiding citizen. The federal courts, however, have
309. But see Rothstein, supra note 286, at 330 (arguing that "[i]t would seem that disorganized
neophyte criminals would be immune from prosecution under the Hollingsworth analysis simply
because they were not yet skilled practitioners of the criminal act").
310. But see id. at 330. This note argued that the Hollingsworth court allowed readiness to
become an independent element of the entrapment defense. The author opines that such a re-
quirement would be very burdensome on law enforcement.
311. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992).
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been unable to agree on the critical element to defeat this defense:
namely, how predisposition should be determined. The Supreme
Court's decision in Jacobson makes it clear that predisposition must
be evaluated prior to government involvement, but then it failed to
clarify how predisposition should be determined.
An analysis of the facts in Thickstun reveals that the Ninth Circuit
failed to protect Thickstun, an otherwise law-biding citizen, by finding
her predisposed to commit the crime, without considering whether she
was in a "position" to commit the crime or how she would have acted
in the most "ordinary of circumstances." This application of the en-
trapment doctrine sent Thickstun to jail, even though she clearly
lacked the criminal predisposition to commit the crime.312 The result
illustrates the need for the Supreme Court to articulate a standardized
approach to predisposition.
The fact finder, utilizing this approach, would be able to conduct an
informed and fair inquiry into whether or not the defendant possessed
predisposition prior to the government's intervention. This approach
would not only successfully separate the "unwary innocent" from the
"unwary criminal," it would also ensure that defendants like Thick-
stun receive justice. Under this approach, the criminal who would
have participated in criminal activity without government intervention
would find no protection from an entrapment defense. At the same
time, this approach protects otherwise law-abiding citizens who would
not have participated in the criminal act(s) if they had not encoun-
tered government officials.
Catherine A. Schultz*
312. But see Thickstun, 110 F.3d at 1396-97 (holding that based on the evidence, a reasonable
jury could conclude that Thickstun was predisposed to commit the crime because "[e]ach predis-
position factor weighs against Thickstun").
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